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​ October 10, 2024

Black Week: The Most Deadliest Week for the US Army Air Force.

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In the span of only a few days in October 1943, the US Army Air Forces was forced to reconsider its entire strategic bombing endeavor in the European theater. The US Eighth Air Force suffered staggering losses, with approximately 148 bombers, nearly 13 percent of the attacking aircraft, lost in a series of missions. These losses prompted planners to halt bombing missions for several months and initiate a fundamental shift in their strategy for strategic bombings. These bloody few days became known as "Black Week," and challenged the very core of Allied air warfare tactics and ultimately reshaped the course of aerial combat.

Hi Reader, welcome back to our weekly coverage of what happened in the skies and on the ground during World War II. This week, the deadliest week for the US Army Air Force known as Black Week. Join us as we delve into the history of one of the most pivotal conflicts ever and remember those who paid the ultimate sacrifice.

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Mission to Münster

On October 10, 1943, the Eighth Air Force was still recovering from two days of grueling bombing raids when they received orders for their next mission – the German city of Münster. This mission was distinctly different from their previous targets, which were primarily industrial and military factories. On this day, their objective was the city's civilian population, specifically the heart of the city and the homes of its working population. To add to the shocking nature of this mission, their orders were explicit: they were to arrive at their target, a medieval cathedral, at noon, precisely as the Sunday mass let out.

The news of this mission deeply unsettled the bomber crews. The Eighth had prided themselves in never attacking civilian populations, and many questioned both the morality and effectiveness of this mission. Ellis Scripture, the lead navigator in the 95th Bomb Group and a deeply religious man, questioned the mission even in the face of a potential court-martial. On the other hand, some were ecstatic upon hearing the target. John Eagan of the 100th Bomb Group was eager to strike back in vengeance for fallen comrades. Regardless of their personal feelings about the mission, the men set out to accomplish their duties.

The primary reason cited for targeting Münster was the city's large population of German rail workers and its significance as a major rail city. The mission's precision, including targeting the steps of the medieval cathedral and synchronizing it with Sunday mass, remained unexplained.

The Eighth Air Force commenced its mission from England, crossing the channel into France, which was relatively routine. They faced German fighters and sustained damage, but nothing compared to what awaited them over their target. As the group of B-17s reached the Ruhr River, the lead bombers from the 3rd Air Division, 13th Combat Wing, witnessed more than 350 enemy fighters approaching the formation head one. The immense force was something the men had not seen in any of their previous bombing missions. Wave after wave of German aircraft made head-on passes at the low group in the formation, the 100th Bomb Group. As one wave of fighters broke away, another slashed through the B-17 formation, and then another and another. The Germans passed so close that the Americans could see the scarves around the enemy pilots’ necks.

The 100th was severely targeted and many crewmembers saw friendly B-17s falling into sickening death rolls with as the crew rushed to bail out. Major John Eagan, the 100th’s command pilot who was earlier so ecstatic over the targeting of Münster, recalled, “It was obvious that we’d had it.” The entire 100th was taking a serious beating. The entire 3rd Air Division had taken massive hits despite not yet reaching their destination.

Over Münster, anti-aircraft fire was equally relentless and bombers were hit heavily by the accurate enemy fire. The bombers reached their target and released their bombs, their bomb bay doors littered with holes. Only six of the 13 B-17s deployed were left in the 100th’s formation. The attack devastated the city center, heavily damaging the cathedral and starting fires that burned for days after the attack. Civilian casualties were estimated to have been over 700.

The return flight saw further Luftwaffe attacks, bent on destroying what was left of the 13th. The surviving bombers were picked up and escorted by friendly P-47s from the 56th Fighter Group safely home. The 13th Combat Wing, to which these B-17s belonged, suffered significant losses, with the 100th Bomb Group, known as the "Bloody Hundredth," experiencing the most severe casualties. Of the 13 aircraft dispatched from the 100th that morning, only one returned, a lone B-17 named Royal Flush. Robert "Rosie" Rosenthal piloted the B-17 and was devastated to hear the news of the 100th. At their headquarters, the silence was immense when Rosie recounted how the 100th was viciously destroyed.

October 10 would be remembered by all who took part in it. The Münster raid wrapped up the bloodiest three days in Eighth Air Force’s history to that point. Eighty-eight B-17s had been lost in three days, nearly 900 men. Weather and attrition forced the Eighth to stand down for the next four days. Their next mission, flown on October 14, would be even worse than Münster. Those who had lived through the first portion of “Black Week” hadn’t seen anything yet.

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Black Thursday

Despite the carnage of the 10th, the Eighth Air Force would again embark on a bombing mission a few days later, targeting ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt, Germany on October 14. This mission served as a follow-up to a previous August raid on the same factories. While the August raid slowed production by 34%, it came at the cost of many American bombers.

On the morning of October 14, 1943, the 1st and 3rd Divisions set off on their 400-mile(643 km) journey, unaware that they were flying into one of the fiercest air battles the Eighth had ever experienced. The Luftwaffe's military intelligence had anticipated a deep penetration attack and prepared their defenses accordingly. A total of 149 bombers came from the 1st Air Division, with 142 more from the 3rd. The mission progressed smoothly, protected by fighter escorts up to the city of Aachen. However, when the P-47s departed for home, the Luftwaffe, alerted by German radar, wasted no time launching their assault.

Wave after wave of German fighters targeted the lead bombers, employing heavy cannons, machine guns, and rockets to disrupt the formation. When the 40th Bomb Wing reached its target, seven of its 49 planes had already been lost with others severely damaged. The toll would ultimately reach 29. Despite their losses, 228 B-17s managed to reach and accurately bomb the target. Of the 1,122 high-explosive bombs dropped, 143 hit the factory area, damaging 88 structures. But this precision came at a high price. The Eighth Air Force lost 60 B-17s out of 229, with five more crash-landing in England. An additional 12 bombers sustained major damage and had to be scrapped, while another 121 required extensive repairs. Tragically, over 600 men were either missing or dead, with an additional 43 wounded.

This catastrophic week of losses, known as "Black Week," reached its peak with the Schweinfurt raid on "Black Thursday." Morale at the air bases plummeted, marked by empty bunks. The Eighth Air Force lost 148 bombers, nearly 13% of its attacking aircraft, and around 1,500 aircrew in that fateful week. It became increasingly evident that long-range fighter escort was a necessity.

The lessons from "Black Thursday" left a profound mark, not just on the men and their aircraft, but also on the theory of daylight strategic bombardment. To succeed in the air war, new doctrines, equipment, and extensive efforts in 1944 would be required.

The strategy of the Allied air forces was not without its flaws. Air Officer Commanding RAF Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, questioned the intelligence that placed such importance on ball bearings for the German war economy. Harris refused cooperation with the Americans. Post-war analysis has since validated his concerns. The Germans had amassed significant reserves of ball bearings, receiving supplies from across Europe. Any operation against these industries, even if successful, would have achieved little. By 1945, the Germans had stockpiled more reserves than ever.

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"…never had we seen so many Germans in the sky at one time and never had their attacks seemed so well coordinated…wherever one looked in the sky there were Germans attacking, and B-17s smoking, burning, and spinning down." - Airmen following the Schweinfurt raid, October 14, 1943

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